The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups

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If people favor their ingroup, are especially concerned with their own group, and attribute different essences to different groups, it follows that their essence must be superior to the essence of other groups. Intelligence, language, and certain emotions are all considered to be distinctive elements of human nature or essence. The role of intelligence and language in discrimination, prejudice, and racism has already been largely investigated, and this article focuses on attributed emotions. Specifically, we investigate the idea that secondary emotions are typically human characteristics, and as such, they should be especially associated with and attributed to the ingroup. Secondary emotions may even be denied to outgroups. These differential associations and attributions of specifically human emotions to ingroups versus outgroups should affect intergroup relations. Results from several initial experiments are summarized that support our reasoning. This emotional approach to prejudice and racism is contrasted with more classic, cognitive perspectives.

If there was not the possibility “to procreate together, … there would be two very distinctive species; the Negro would be to the man what the donkey is to the horse; or rather, if the White was the man, the Negro would no longer be a man, it would be a special animal like the ape.”
—Buffon (1833–1834, Vol. X, p. 171)

Because Buffon was a rigorous scientific, and because he had observed that all human beings could procreate together, he had concluded that there was a single species of human beings. However, given their different ways of life, he thought that some groups (e.g., Blacks, Native Americans, aboriginal Australians) more resembled animals than (Western) persons. In this article, we argue that most individuals are sometimes tempted to think like Buffon and to treat other groups as “infrahumans.”

It has become a truism to state that people categorize their social environment into ingroups and outgroups and, although not ineluctably, that group
members exhibit ingroup favoritism biases or ethnocentrism. People prefer their ingroup to an outgroup (e.g., Perdue, Dovidio, Gurzman, & Tyler, 1990), they interpret more leniently an ambiguous behavior performed by an ingroup member than by an outgroup member (e.g., Duncan, 1976), they excuse more readily antinormative behaviors committed by an ingrouper than by an outgroup (e.g., Hewstone, 1990), they perceive bias in neutral reports of their conflict with an outgroup (e.g., Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985), they attribute more positive attributes to the ingroup than to the outgroup (e.g., Scaillet & Leyens, 2000), and so on. Ingroup favoritism measures of all kinds have been an object of study in the social psychological literature of the last decades.

Less frequent than ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 1979), outgroup derogation also serves to make one’s group appear superior to the outgroup. People derogate outgroupers to feel better (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997). When under threat, they try to restore a positive image of their ingroup by denigrating the outgroup (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). Low-status groups derogate higher status groups more than nonthreatened high-status groups do (Scaillet & Leyens, 2000). An increasing number of researchers, however, are currently thinking that ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation reflect a protection of the ingroup more than an attack of the outgroup (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Sears, 1988; Smith, 1993; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, in press). Discrimination, be it ethnic, sexual, national, and so forth, is first of all a concern about the purity of one’s group versus “Others” (Schatz & Staub, 1997).

### Essentialism in Ingroup–Outgroup Distinctions

The psychological distance between “my” group and “others” can be reified by subjective essentialism. In a fascinating chapter on theory-based categorization, Rothbort and Taylor (1992) identified three types of categories: natural, social, and artifactual. They suggested that, to the same extent that people attribute different essences to natural categories (e.g., mammal vs. oviparous), they tend to attribute different essences (e.g., genetic, cultural, linguistic) to social categories (see also Corneille & Leyens, 1994). These essences linked to social categories serve both to differentiate radically between groups and to unite members of a given group into an entity (Campbell, 1958). In other words, through subjective essentialism, all members of a specific group share something in common, and what they share makes them distinctive from members of other groups.

If people think that their group is superior to other groups, are especially concerned about their own group, and attribute different essences to their ingroup and outgroups, then it follows that people should believe that “the” human essence belongs to their ingroup and that an infrahuman essence characterizes (some) outgroups.

In this article, we first present what we mean by the link between racism and human essence. We then concentrate on the emotional aspect of this essence. More specifically, we defend the thesis that certain emotions (i.e., secondary emotions) are part of the human essence restricted to the ingroup. In support of this thesis, we summarize results of an initial set of empirical studies, and we then speculate about the implications of this thesis for empathy and prosocial behavior. Finally, we compare this approach with other views on intergroup discrimination.

### “Any Racism Is an Essentialism”

This quotation of the French sociologist Bourdieu (1980, p. 264) introduces our thesis. As we see in the next section, several features are consensually considered necessary (though none of them is sufficient) to be perceived as human beings. We argue that placing people in the others category, or discriminating against them, results in denying them one or several of the typically human characteristics. When using the generic term of racism in the rest of this article, we mean any discrimination or prejudice against people because they are part of a given group with a different essence than one’s own, be it biological (Jones, 1997), national (Billig, 1976), religious (Deconch, 1980), or some other essential feature. The people in these groups are others; they are radically different from “us,” and as such, they lack typically human characteristics and, therefore, are considered infrahumans.

Examples of infrahumanization of outgroups are pervasive in the anthropological literature:

Humankind ceases at the border of the tribe, of the linguistic group, even sometimes of the village; [This happens] to such extent that a great many of so-called primitive populations give themselves a name that means “humans” (or sometimes—let us say with more discretion—the “goods,” the “excellents,” the “completes”) implying by this that the other tribes, groups or villages do not share the human virtues—or even nature, but are composed at best of “bads,” “nasties,” “earthly monkeys” or “louse’s eggs.” (Lévi-Strauss, 1952/1987, p. 21; see also Fried, 1975; Shanklin, 1994)

As another example of infrahumanity, the first U.S. Constitution stated in its Article 1, Section 2, that slaves, almost all Blacks, were to be counted as three
fifths of a person each. More recently, the official discourse of the Nazi system lowered Jews and Gypsies to the rank of (harmful) animals.

**Related Concepts**

Bar-Tal (1989) spoke of “deligitimization,” which “is defined as categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values” (p. 170). Other authors (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989) have spoken of “moral exclusion”:

Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as **outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply**. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just. (Opotow, 1990, p. 173)

Most of the time, moral exclusion is invoked to explain extreme behaviors such as ethnicides, immigration policies, and eugenics. Here, we defend the hypothesis that moral exclusion is a common phenomenon if it is not restricted to extreme behaviors but takes into account milder forms of discrimination. In this sense, our thesis is closer to Schwartz and Struch’s (1989) concept of “perceived humanity of the outgroup.” For them, outgroupers “are assumed to share our humanity to a lesser degree” (Schwartz & Struch, 1989, p. 154), and this lesser humanity should be reflected in the perception of different values. Indeed, Struch and Schwartz showed that perceived value dissimilarity mediated aggression toward an outgroup. Also, values such as equality, helpfulness, and honesty typically differentiate the ingroup from an outgroup (Schwartz & Struch, 1989) and correlate with the willingness for outgroup contacts (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995).

**Emotions and Human Essence**

What are typically human characteristics? We asked the question to French-speaking Louvain-la-Neuve and Spanish Tenerife students. The lists of characteristics spontaneously generated by the participants were codable into a relatively few categories, and the results for both samples were totally convergent. The most often cited characteristics were, in rank order: intelligence (reasoning, thinking, etc.), *sentiments–sentimientos* (or exemplars of this category), language (communication), positive sociability (sociable, fun-loving, etc.), values (justice, solidarity, etc.), and negative sociability (cruel, nasty, etc.). The word *émotion–emoción* was rarely mentioned, and when it was, it appeared at the end of the lists.

Because there is ample research demonstrating that individuals discriminate on the basis of intelligence (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), language (Giles & Coupland, 1991), and sociability (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1999; Peeters, 1992), we concentrated our attention on the emotional side of the human essence. Actually, emotions rarely have been invoked in the study of prejudice except for investigations of emotional reactions in the presence of stigmatized outgroupers (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Self-reports (e.g., Dijker, 1987; Verkuyten, Drabbbles, & Van den Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999), physiological measures (for a review, see Guglielmi, 1999), and nonverbal behavior (e.g., Wagner & Smith, 1991) have been used for this purpose. More recently, studies have appeared on the role of affect in intergroup discrimination (e.g., Bless, Schwarz, & Kemmelmeier, 1996; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, Rust, & Guerra, 1998; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996), and calls have been made to associate investigations on emotions and intergroup relations (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994; Smith, 1993, 1999). However, emotions have not been investigated as they are attributed or denied to people as a way to accept them in or to reject them from one’s group. This neglect is surprising given the claim that there is a primacy of emotions over cognition in apprehending the environment (Zajonc, 1980, 1998) and the evidence that emotions are involved in categorizing this environment (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 1999).

Before summarizing empirical evidence in favor of our thesis, a language problem has to be addressed. As made obvious by their responses, Belgian and Spanish participants clearly differentiate between *émotion–emoción* and *sentiment–sentimiento*. Only *sentiments–sentimientos* are typically human; *émotions–emociones* are common to humans and animals. This distinction between *émotions* and *sentiments* is present in all Roman languages. It is also present in other languages such as Dutch (*gevoelen* is the equivalent of *sentiment–sentimiento*) or German (*Gefühle* is the equivalent of *sentiment–sentimiento*). Such an explicit distinction does not exist in English. The closest we came to it is the well-known taxonomy of primary versus secondary emotions (e.g., Epstein, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Stein & Oatley, 1992).

Although approaching the problem from different perspectives (e.g., evolution, neurology, facial expression), many authors posit a set of relatively few biologically based emotions (for reviews, see Kemper, 1987; Plutchik, 1994). Despite disagreement about the precise number of primary emotions, most authors include joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise. Ekman

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1We are grateful to Paula Niedenthal for suggesting this distinction.
(1992) proposed nine characteristics that distinguish primary emotions. Some of the characteristics that are relevant for our purpose are presence in other primates, quick onset, brief duration, and unbidden occurrence. Several authors (e.g., Izard, 1977; Sroufe, 1979) also suggested that primary emotions appear early in life. By contrast, secondary emotions "are products of social construction through the attachment of social definitions, labels, and meanings to differentiated conditions of interaction and social organization" (Kemper, 1987, p. 276). Examples of secondary emotions are affection, admiration, pride, conceit, nostalgia, remorse, and rancor.

In our opinion, the best way to intuitively make the (lay) distinction between sentiments and emotions, or the (scientific) distinction between secondary and primary emotions, as we call them here, is to ask oneself, "Would I apply this emotional term to an animal such as a rabbit or a fish?" An animal can show anger, sadness, elation, or surprise, but people will probably not say that the animal is in a state of disillusion, sorrow, felicity, or admiration.

To better understand what distinguishes primary and secondary emotions, we (Leyens, Demoulin, Paladino, Rodriguez, & Rodriguez, 1999) gave to Belgian French-speaking and Canary Islands participants a list of some 50 a priori selected primary and secondary emotions. The stimuli covered the terms most often encountered in the emotion literature as well as prototypical answers obtained from pretests. On the basis of the same pretests, we attempted to equalize the number of a priori primary and secondary emotions as well as their valence. Participants were asked to rate each of the stimulus words on a series of dimensions. For both samples, results of a correspondence analysis showed that a solution with two axes accounted perfectly for the data. As expected, the four quadrants corresponded to positive primary, negative primary, positive secondary, and negative secondary emotions.

More interesting are the characteristics that were found to distinguish between primary and secondary emotions. Compared to primary emotions, secondary emotions were rated more human, more internally caused, more invisible, more cognitive, more moral, less intense, longer in time, and appearing later in age. Several of these characteristics coincide with those proposed by Ekman (1992) and Sroufe (1979). It also should be noted that most of the characteristics of secondary emotions are akin to adult human beings: They involve cognition, morality, evolution, memory, and an active, rather than reactive, role of the person.

**Empirical Evidence**

Having explained what we mean by the human essence and primary versus secondary emotions, we present some initial data in defense of the following hypotheses:

1. People should more easily associate their ingroup than an outgroup with secondary emotions. This preferential association should be true independent of the valence of the secondary emotions. Indeed, it is the category of secondary emotions as such that is considered typically human. No qualification is made for positive or negative secondary emotions.

2. Not only should people associate more easily their ingroup than an outgroup with secondary emotions, but they also should tend to deny the possibility that outgroup members have secondary emotions.

3. The preceding reactions will affect social interactions, especially when empathy and altruism are involved.

**Adaptation of the Implicit Association Task**

Because we were convinced that few persons would admit explicitly to having more difficulty associating outgroupers than ingroupers with secondary emotions, we opted for an implicit measure of differential association. The implicit association task developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) seemed particularly well suited for our purpose. In this task, participants have to decide as rapidly as possible between two categories. The stimuli consist of two kinds of terms: names of the ingroup and outgroup, and positive and negative words. In simple tasks, stimuli varying on only one dimension (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup) are flashed on the computer and people have to decide to which category each stimulus belongs. If they make the wrong decision, a feedback error is sent. In two other more complex tasks, the two kinds of stimuli are randomly presented in an alternative order and, again, the decision is binary; one task is said to be compatible (ingroup-positive vs. outgroup-negative) and the other incompatible (ingroup-negative vs. outgroup-positive). The difference in reaction times between the compatible and incompatible tasks serves as an index of discrimination (the IAT index). Greenwald et al. used social categories as stimuli (e.g., White and Black names with positive or negative words). For these social categories, the IAT index was impressive, but the correlations with questionnaire measures of prejudice varied greatly, from none to small correlations.

In a series of studies (Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez, & Rodriguez, 1999), we replaced the American names by North African (the outgroup) or Spanish and French names (the ingroup) and the positive and negative words by either secondary and primary positive emotions, or by secondary and primary negative emotions. In all cases, the differences in reaction times between
the compatible (ingroup and secondary emotions) and incompatible (outgroup and secondary emotions) tasks were highly significant, and the IAT indexes showed a remarkable effect size in each experiment. As in the case of Greenwald et al. 's (1998) studies, the correlations between the IAT indexes and questionnaire measures of subtle racism varied from significant to zero.

Participants in one of the studies had to complete two successive tasks. In the first task, the stimuli were French versus North African names and secondary versus primary emotions. The latter stimuli had been pretrained as equally positive. In the second task, the names remained, but the emotions were replaced by positive and negative words unrelated to emotions. Two IAT indexes were thus obtained for the same participants. In both cases, their size effects were relatively large. What is more interesting is that the correlation between the two IAT indexes, although positive, did not reach significance. An obvious reason is the small number of participants. More intriguing is the possibility that the two tasks tap different processes. Like many implicit measures of prejudice, the second task involved words with very different valences. The positive primary and secondary emotions of the first task, on the other hand, had equivalent valence but reflected two different qualities. This divergence in the kind of stimuli may account for the absence of correlation.

In conclusion, this initial set of experiments illustrates that people associate more easily secondary emotions with the ingroup and primary emotions with an outgroup than the reverse. This was true for both positive and negative emotions. The problem with the IAT index is that one does not know what is the exact factor that triggers the difference between the compatible and incompatible tasks. The shorter latency time in the compatible task may be due to either or both ingroup–secondary emotion and outgroup–primary emotion. The longer latency times may result from either or both ingroup–primary emotion and outgroup–secondary emotion. In other words, four factors and their different interactions may be responsible for the effect. Because we were interested in the specific role of secondary emotions, we investigated the same phenomenon with a different paradigm.

Differential Attritions of Secondary Emotions to Ingroup and Outgroup

According to our hypothesis, people should spontaneously attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to an outgroup. Again, this should be true for positive as well as for negative secondary emotions. No clear prediction can be made for primary emotions, because they do not distinguish between humans and nonhumans, and their attribution may depend, for instance, on their valence.

In a first study (Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Paladino, & Vaes, 1999, Experiment 1), a sheet with a list of words was distributed to students in Tenerife (Canary Islands), Madrid, and Barcelona (mainland Spain, or Peninsula). The stimulus words were positive primary and secondary emotions as well as positive words related to competence and niceness (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Glick & Fiske, 1999). It should be noted that Canarians resent the dominating role of Peninsulars and stereotype themselves as more likeable and less competent. Peninsulars, on the other hand, tend to look down on Canarians and view themselves as more competent and less likeable than Canarians. Because Peninsulars were the outgroup for Canarians, we decided to test two different groups of Peninsulars—Castilians from Madrid and Catalans from Barcelona. Such sampling precludes the criticism that Peninsulars were represented by only one region of the country. Half of the participants in each of the three universities were instructed to check the defining words of their ingroup (Canarians or Peninsulars); they could choose as many words as they wanted but were encouraged not to take too many. The other participants were instructed to check the defining words of the outgroup. In accordance with Glick and Fiske's (1999) model, both Peninsulars and Canarians attributed more competence words to Peninsulars and more sociability words to Canarians. There was no difference of attributions of primary emotions. More important for our purpose, both groups selected more secondary emotions for their ingroup than for the outgroup.

We replicated the study with Canarian students only (Leyens, Rodriguez, Paladino, et al., 1999, Experiment 2). This time, however, each category (i.e., primary emotions, secondary emotions, competence, niceness) was composed of an equal number of positively and negatively valenced words. For the sake of generalizability, the positive primary and secondary emotions differed from those used in the previous study. Moreover, the word intelligence comprised a category by itself. Because of the abundance of results, we restrict ourselves to the data pertaining to secondary emotions and intelligence. As expected, participants selected more positive and negative secondary emotions for the ingroup than for the outgroup. The data for the word intelligence are also of interest because intelligence is another typically human characteristic, like secondary emotions. Although Canarian participants attributed competence to the Peninsulars, they did not consider the outgroup more intelligent than their ingroup.

2The paradigm of Studies 1 and 2 in Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, et al. (1999) is borrowed from Yzerbyt and Castano (1999).
In the first study on attribution, people selected more positive secondary emotions for their ingroup than for the outgroup. Although the stimuli were changed in the second study, the result was replicated. Moreover, it generalized to negative secondary emotions. In both studies, however, specific exemplars of secondary emotions were provided. What would occur when participants have no access to exemplars and have to work simply on the basis of labels?

To test this possibility, we (Leyens, Rodriguez, et al., 1999, Experiment 3) borrowed a paradigm developed by Krueger, Rothbart, and Sriram (1989). In a first phase, participants received a series of numbers (four digits plus two decimals) applying to two categories. The two distributions of numbers were constructed to be symmetrical, unimodal, with the same standard deviation, and to border each other but with no overlap. After each block of four numbers in each category, participants had to calculate mentally the mean of each category. During the second phase, the participants’ task remained the same, but some of the numbers of one category were increased, resulting in a higher mean than during the first phase. No change occurred for the other category. Participants were not informed about the difference between the two phases.

The two categories represented the ingroup (Canarians) and the outgroup (Peninsulars). Moreover, the numbers were said to reflect the degree of calcium, or the degree of primary emotions (emociones), or the degree of secondary emotions (sentimientos) of each group. For half the participants, the ingroup was represented by the category that remained stable across the two phases. For the remaining participants, it was the outgroup that did not change. Crosscutting this variable, the ingroup was either inferior or superior to the outgroup. The degree of calcium should not be involving for the participants, and its estimates, which should not differ as a function of membership, could serve as a baseline. According to our previous results, there is no reason to attribute different levels of primary emotions to either group, and therefore, we expected that the estimates for the primary emotions would follow those given for calcium. The estimates for secondary emotions, however, should vary as a function of the ingroup-outgroup categorization.

Following Krueger et al. (1989), difference scores were calculated between the two phases for the category whose mean changed during Phase 2. As expected, the interaction between the groups and the meaning of the numbers were significant. There was no difference in means between groups for calcium and primary emotions, and they did not differ from themselves. The difference for secondary emotions, however, was highly significant. The difference scores for secondary emotions were much higher for the ingroup than for the outgroup. In fact, the estimations of secondary emotions of the ingroup did not differ from those for calcium and primary emotions. Those for the outgroup, however, differed significantly, indicating a reliable decrease from the baseline.

To recap this section, we showed that members of different status groups spontaneously attribute a variety of positive secondary emotions more to their ingroup than to the outgroup. This differential attribution of secondary emotions also extends to negative secondary emotions. It also occurs when mere labels and no exemplars are provided. The last study, involving labels rather than exemplars, also tends to suggest that people not only attribute fewer secondary emotions to the outgroup, but that they are also reluctant to make such attributions. This last result serves as an introduction to the next section, in which we attempt to show that people deny secondary emotions to outgroups.

**Denial of Secondary Emotions to the Outgroup**

Demonstrating denial of secondary emotions can only be done in a subtle way, without people realizing what is being measured because of social desirability concerns. No standard paradigm exists to document denial. It is possible, however, to use paradigms for which one knows the typical, usual answer. If, by experimental construction, the answer should be a secondary emotion, and if people do not give this answer or do it infrequently, we speak of denial. Using this logic, we conducted a series of experiments using the Wason selection task paradigm (Leyens, Rodriguez, Demoulin, Paladino, & Rodriguez, 1999).

In the abstract version of the Wason task, participants receive a conditional rule, for example, “If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side of the card.” They have four cards in front of them (A, B, 3, 8), and they know that each card has a letter on one side and a single number on the other side. Participants are asked to select only those cards they need to turn over to determine if the experimenter is lying when asserting the conditional statement. As far as formal logic is concerned, the correct selection is P and not Q (here the cards A and 8). Indeed, the rule would not be respected if a number other than 3 were written on the other side of the A card, or if the letter A were written on the other side of the 8 card. When participants are faced with the abstract version of the Wason selection task, most of them select the P card or the P and Q cards and commit a “matching bias.”

Leyens and Scailliet (1999; Scailliet & Leyens, 1999, 2000) have worked with conditionals such as “If this person belongs to ingroup (outgroup), then s/he has attribute x (positive or negative).” The outgroup had either a higher or lower status than the ingroup. With this
material, participants did not consider the logical status
of the cards (P, non-P, Q, non-Q). They simply took
into account the visible sides of the cards and selected
the positive ingroup pair of cards, independent of the
rule. Such choice was overwhelming when the ingroup
had a lower status than the outgroup. In the experi-mental
scenarios that were staged, it was impossible for
lower status members to change groups; their only so-
lution to restore a positive image of their group was to
show an immense ingroup favoritism (and, subsidiary,
an outgroup derogation).

In the studies that we conducted to show denial,
each participant received one rule that she or he had to
falsify. Different rules were used for which P and
non-P were the ingroup and the outgroup (or the re-
verse) and Q and non-Q were a secondary emotion or a
primary emotion (or the reverse). We made sure that
the primary and secondary emotions cards were identi-
cal in terms of social desirability. The ingroups
and outgroups were, respectively, Canarians versus Penin-
sular Spanish (Leyens, Rodriguez, Demoulin, et al.,
1999, Experiment 1), Belgian Wallons versus Bel-
gian Flemish (Experiment 2), and Belgian Wallons
versus French (Experiment 3). In the first two cases,
there is a history of conflict between the groups. In the
third case, we manipulated the relation, positive versus
negative, between Belgian Wallons and French. The
measurement of the dependent variable varied across
studies. In one experiment, the four cards (P, non-P, Q,
non-Q) were presented, and participants were asked to
rate the extent to which they wanted to turn over each
card; they were instructed to use different scale points
for each card. In the other two studies, the same in-
structions were provided but relevant pairs of cards
(P-Q; non-P; P-Q; non-P) instead of single cards,
were to be rated. In every case, it was possible
to rank the choices and count the frequency of
each choice for every order. Aggregating over the
different rules, no difference should have emerged if par-
ticipants had adopted the matching bias (or, for the
same reason, the logically correct responses).

Independent of the samples, there was always a tre-
mendous difference between the choices of the ingroup–secondary emotion pair and the outgroup–
secondary pair. The ingroup–secondary emotion pair
was always preferred to the outgroup–secondary emo-
tion pair. This result was obtained even when a pos-
tive relation was induced between Wallons and
French. Moreover, the fact that the last possible choice
of the participants was overwhelmingly represented by
the outgroup–secondary emotion pair strongly sug-
gests an interpretation in terms of denial (Leyens, Ro-
driguez, Demoulin, et al., 1999, Experiments 2 and 3).

The potency and stability of this preference for the
ingroup–secondary emotion over the outgroup–sec-
ondary emotion obliged us to determine whether there
are conditions in which participants would not dis-
criminate between the ingroup–secondary emotion and
the outgroup–secondary emotion pairs of cards. To this
purpose, we (Leyens, Rodriguez, Demoulin, et al.,
1999, Experiment 4) took advantage of our earlier
work on social judgeability showing that people do not
feel entitled to judge an individual on the basis of his or
her mere social category (Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Corneille,
1998; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Schadron, 1997; Yzerbyt,
Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). This time, the
rules provided to Canarian participants no longer
involved an ingroup or an outgroup but a spec-
ific individual belonging either to the ingroup or the
outgroup (actually, we used the first name and surname
of two colleagues, one Spanish—Juan Perez—and the
other German—Klaus Fiedler). As expected, replacing
the groups by specific individuals erased the difference
in the choice of the cards.3

It remains that the adopted paradigm can be critic-
ized on the grounds that it shows attribution rather
than denial. Indeed, no visible “effort” to avoid
outgroup–secondary emotions is measured or manipu-
lated. Another indirect test of denial could consist of
showing that an outgroup–secondary emotion associa-
tion results from an intentional process, whereas an
ingroup–secondary emotion association is rather auto-
matic. Jacoby’s (1991) procedure for dissociating au-
tomatic from intentional uses of memory could be
fruitful in this respect.

Secondary Emotions and
Prosocial Behavior

In this last section, we envisage the implications for
everyday life of our essentialist perspective focused on
secondary emotions. It is more speculative than the
previous ones because we are only starting to investi-
gate some of these implications. Two of the major dis-
tinguishing features of secondary emotions relative to
primary emotions are that the former are much less vis-
ible and much more related to morality. These unobtru-
sive moral features may play a major role in social
interactions between persons of different groups. Here,
we consider especially prosocial behaviors, because
they may be influenced by group membership and type
of emotions.

In Latané and Darley’s (1970) experiments on by-
stander nonintervention, an increasing number of wit-
nesses who did not know each other decreased the
probability that the victim would be helped. Miller
and McFarland (1987) explained this phenomenon in

3The results of this study staging two specific persons do not contra-
dict the IAT experiments in which first names were used. In the latter
studies, names signaled a category rather than specific individuals.
terms of pluralistic ignorance. The emergency situation induces embarrassment, an affective invisible state according to Miller and McFarland (Experiment 1) and a secondary emotion, according to our normative data (Leyens, Demoulin, et al., 1999). Everyone is embarrassed, and all think that they are more embarrassed than the others. Because the other individuals do not seem ill at ease, nobody reacts (Miller & McFarland, 1987, Experiment 3). Everyone behaves like everyone else because all think that it is the norm, although none agree with this norm. Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) presented a similar explanation under the label “illusion of transparency.” Everyone believes that his or her embarrassment is visible to the others but, in fact, no one perceives this embarrassment and, therefore, nobody reacts (Gilovich et al., 1998, Experiment 3).

Both the pluralistic ignorance and the illusion of transparency do not take into account the difference of reactions between witnesses who know each other and help in emergency situations, and those who do not know each other and do not help. The two experiments that tested these explanations involved interpersonal relations rather than intergroup relations. The “other” individuals in the experiments, however, were strangers to the participants. One may speculate that things would differ when the others are ingroup members rather than outgroup members, because people more easily attribute secondary emotions to their ingroup than to the outgroup. Therefore, participants should attribute embarrassment more easily and react accordingly in situations in which others are identified as ingroup members.

As we wrote previously, the nonattribution or the denial of secondary emotions to others may negatively influence social interactions. Nonintervention in cases of emergency is only one example. Guilt, embarrassment, or compunction due to the involuntary expression of prejudice is another example (Devine, Monteith, Zuwierinck, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith & Voils, 1998). Collective guilt (Branscombe, Schiftzauer, & Valencia, 1997; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) is a third example. In the latter two examples, people feel guilty because of what either they personally or generally have done to stigmatized groups. Although the idea has not been tested, to our knowledge, it would be interesting to know the reactions of stigmatized groups to these secondary emotions. Do they notice them? According to Gilovich et al. (1998, Experiments 1 and 2), guilty people feel that their body is reacting to the situation and infer that their feeling is visible to others. However, others underestimate the display of these feelings (Gilovich et al., 1998) or attribute the awkwardness of the situation to patronizing attitudes (Kleck & Strenta, 1980).

Sometimes, people who seek help directly invoke primary or secondary emotions from potential helpers. It has time and again been verified that similar others facilitate prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995). Prosocial behavior, therefore, should be greater when prompted by secondary emotions claimed by ingroupers than when prompted by primary ones. Indeed, secondary emotions should convey a greater feeling of ingroup membership than primary emotions.

This hypothesis was tested using a “lost e-mail” technique (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 1999). An e-mail was “erroneously” sent to researchers in a nearby university. Its content referred to the feedback of reviewers about a coauthored manuscript and asked for a discussion of this feedback. In each case, the message started either with one of several positive (e.g., pleasure) or negative (e.g., rage) primary emotions, or with one of various positive (e.g., delight) and negative (e.g., disillusion) secondary emotions. The independent variables did not affect the rate of answers. Valence influenced the length of the answers: Positive emotions induced longer responses than negative ones. More interesting for our purpose, and as expected, the type of emotion had an effect on the affective tonality of the answers, irrespective of valence. The answers were more supportive for secondary emotions than for primary emotions. Because of the e-mail content and the type of its receivers, one may assume that receivers perceived the sender as an ingroup member (i.e., they were all researchers). It is unlikely that the same findings would be obtained for an outgroup member (Horstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968). Because people believe that secondary emotions are “theirs,” they may not react to secondary emotions coming from outgroups, and they may even resent this appeal to secondary emotions.

Cautious Optimism

This thesis differs from previous social psychological approaches to prejudice and racism in two respects. First, it adopts an essentialist perspective; second, it concentrates on the emotional side of the human essence rather than on its cognitive side. If people think that their group is superior to other groups, are concerned about their own group, and attribute different essences to their ingroup and outgroups, then they will attribute the human essence to their ingroup and infrahumanize outgroups by attributing to the latter fewer secondary emotions, or even by denying the sec-

\*Guilt is considered a primary emotion by Izard (1977). By most authors, however, guilt is considered a secondary emotion (Pilchuk, 1994).
ondary emotions, which are considered typically human characteristics.

Some persons find the term *infrahumanization* shocking. It is, but this reaction raises two questions, one concerning the label and the other its content. In the beginning of this article, we compared our conceptualization to related concepts in the literature. "Lesser perceived humanity" (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz & Struch, 1989; Struch & Schwartz, 1989) is exactly what we mean by infrahumanization, but the former concept is originally linked to values. "Delegitimization" (Bar-Tal, 1989) and "moral exclusion" (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989) also may apply, but they traditionally are associated with extreme immoral behaviors.

The issue of content is more crucial. Although other words could have been used, we really mean what the concept of infrahumanization connotes. The ease with which the data were obtained and their strength convinced us that individuals do spontaneously regard outgroups as in some ways less human. Strictly speaking, we never demonstrated that our participants really infrahumanized others; infrahumanization refers to our essentialist interpretation of the data. Our participants certainly would deny that they infrahumanize others; this is the reason that we always used indirect or implicit measures.

Of course, the participants' overt answers cannot constitute a criterion in favor of or against our interpretation. Let us assume that the differential associations, attributions, denials of secondary emotions to ingroup and outgroup, and their facilitating effect on helping an ingrouper simply reflect a bias. If it is a bias, what would its functions be? It is not a simple positivity bias, because in all experiments, we have been careful to control the valence of the primary and secondary emotions. It is not a bias whose function would be to counter the threat brought by an outgroup when the ingroup is part of the self and expresses a set of group emotions (e.g., fear, anger, resentment, envy; Smith, 1999). Indeed, in Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, et al. (1999, Experiment 1), the high-status group was not threatened by the low-status group. Moreover, the emotions included in this set of experiments never involved emotions against the outgroup. It could be a protection bias. Reserving secondary emotions to the ingroup and attributing only primary emotions to foreigners could protect people from being overwhelmed by the tragedies that constantly occur far away ("They are sad, but they will get over it quickly"). It also would allow people to care deeply for familiars (e.g., mourning, distress, and sensitivity) when incidents happen in one's ingroup. Such a protection bias is not far from the idea of infrahumanization. Indeed, why are people so generally blunt when hearing of ethnocide, civil wars, and so forth? Our answer is that they consider the actors of such dramas radically different from them. Anthropological data (Lévi-Strauss, 1952/1987; see also Fried, 1975; Shanklin, 1994) do support this thesis and seem to indicate that the phenomenon is universal.

In a recent provocative chapter about the uncontrollability of automatic stereotype effects, Bar (1999) spoke of a "cognitive monster." He meant by this metaphor that motivation and effortful cognitions are of no use when stereotypes have been activated automatically. We are not ready to propose an "emotional monster." First, it is not our thesis that all outgroups are infrahumanized to the same extent by everybody at all times. For infrahumanization to occur, the members of the outgroup have to be considered radically different from the discriminators and to be attributed a different essence.

Conflict between groups may be a facilitating factor for infrahumanization, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because people may never have encountered Tibetans or Maoris, for instance, and still consider them others (Hartley, 1946). It is not sufficient because groups (e.g., employees and supervisors) may have a very conflictual relation and still respect each other (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992). Furthermore, infrahumanization is not a matter of all or none. People have degrees of freedom as to the extent to which Others lack typically human characteristics. For instance, it may be difficult to deny secondary emotions to certain groups (e.g., women); if these groups are disliked, there are other means to devaluate them (e.g., by denying them intelligence). Alas, it is also possible to deny both intelligence and secondary emotions. It remains, however, that the data reported here do not appear very optimistic. Without awareness, people tend not to attribute secondary emotions to outgroups. They deny to others, even nonthreatening ones, the possibility of having such secondary emotions. Because such others are unlike "ordinary people," misunderstandings will take place and lead to neglect of appeals for help.

Attenuating the pessimistic perspective just outlined, the perception of primary and secondary emotions is probably more malleable than the intelligence and sociability components involved in stereotypes (Fiske et al., 1999). There are at least two arguments in favor of the flexibility of primary and secondary emotions. The first argument is that "emotions serve a communicative function both within the brain and within the social group" (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989, p. 84). As such, emotions are particularly sensible to context (the propositional message, according to Johnson-Laird & Oatley). The emotion provoked by one's skin being touched by someone will depend on who is touching. Similarly, pain has many variants, depending on its source. Second, others may instantly become ours. Canarians may instantly become Spanish.
like the Peninsulars when confronted with Portuguese. Belgian Walloons and Flemish become instantly Belgians when their soccer team plays against another country.

Conclusions

In this article, we defended several ideas.

1. In general, individuals are ethnocentric. We argued that this propensity reflects more a concern about the ingroup than a reaction against outgroups.

2. We defended the idea that discrimination against others results in considering them infrahumans. If people favor their ingroup, if they are especially concerned with their own group, and if they attribute different essences to different groups, it follows that their essence must be superior to the essence of other groups. The essence can be genetic, linguistic, religious, cultural, and so forth. In every case, if "we" have the human essence, others' essence can only be infrahuman.

3. There are several typically human characteristics. They are all necessary but none is sufficient for being considered human. This necessity is brilliantly and succinctly epitomized by Trollope (1973) in his novel The Prime Minister. Here is the description of his hero who married a young woman well above his social class:

   In a sense he was what is called a gentleman. He knew how to speak, and how to look, how to use a knife and fork, how to dress himself, and how to walk. But he had not the faintest notion of the feelings of a gentleman. (p. 168)

   In a few sentences, Trollope captured our thesis: The hero was intelligent, and his language was appropriate, but something was wrong in the so-called affective domain. Among the typically human characteristics, we focused on secondary emotions. This perspective is rather unique. On the one hand, contemporary research on prejudice tends to focus on cognitive factors. On the other hand, emotions often have been restricted to the emotional reactions induced by encounters with stigmatized groups. Here, the focus is not on the emotions felt by the dominant group but on the emotions admitted to others by members of dominant or dominated groups. Secondary emotions are typically human and, therefore, part of the human essence. Primary emotions, on the other hand, are not restricted to human beings.

4. We summarized a series of experiments showing that people (a) more easily associate their ingroup with secondary emotions and an outgroup with primary emotions than the reverse, (b) are more likely to attribute secondary emotions spontaneously to their ingroup than to an outgroup, and (c) seem to deny to the "others" category the possibility of having secondary emotions. Focusing on secondary emotions helps to understand awkwardness in social situations, such as nonintervention in an emergency situation, indifference to requests, and compunction after a prejudiced slur.

5. Our perspective may appear to be a pessimistic one. It is certainly a realistic one. On the other hand, we suggest that the perception of primary and secondary emotions is more malleable than views of people in terms of competence and sociability. Whereas competence and sociability are heavily constrained by the society, attributions or denials of secondary emotions are independent of such constraints, and they may come and go.

When Allport (1954) wrote that "Defeated intellectually, prejudice lingers emotionally" (p. 328), he meant that many people intellectually recognize but yield to the emotional irrationality of their prejudice. Until now, this irrationality has been taken for granted. When emotions were investigated, they were restricted to the reactions induced by the presence of stigmatized members. We hope to have raised at least some good questions about this irrationality.

References


INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND EMOTIONS


